On paper, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are Iraqi state-controlled paramilitary forces. However, they have once again gained attention as they have conducted hundreds of drone and missile attacks in Iraq, Kurdistan, and neighboring Gulf states, all of which were directed by their masters in Tehran. The targets of these attacks were US and allied forces. As Islamic State terrorists advanced across Iraq in 2014, four divisions of the Iraqi Army and a significant portion of its Federal Police force collapsed. An assault directly threatened both Baghdad and Erbil. Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Sistani, the most senior Shia cleric, immediately issued a call to arms to safeguard the Shia homeland and sacred shrines in Iraq. The concept of al-Hashd al-Shaabi, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that was dominated by Shia, was conceived at this very moment. The most frequently asserted assertion is that the PMF was established in response to a religious fatwa issued by the Grand Ayatollah. This is an inaccurate interpretation of Sistani's genuine statement. Sistani issued a call for collective defense, encouraging Iraqis to volunteer to defend their country. He did not advocate for the establishment of independent armed groups or militias outside of the Iraqi state. In response to the fatwa, volunteers had the option of joining the Iraqi army, police, or other official security institutions. The fatwa did not authorize the establishment of distinct militia structures, such as the PMF.

Another frequently cited argument by PMF supporters is that the organization was rendered legitimate after Iraq's parliament enacted legislation formally acknowledging it. This argument disregards a fundamental constitutional concern. Article 9 of the Iraqi constitution explicitly prohibits the formation of militias outside of the official armed forces. Further, Article 13 stipulates that no law may be in conflict with the constitution. Even if parliament passes legislation recognizing the PMF, the law cannot override the constitution. The PMF's existence is still highly controversial and legally problematic according to constitutional standards. Major General Qassem Soleimani, the infamous commander of the Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, supervised the formation of PMF. It served a purpose that transcended the battlefield's conflict with ISIS. The organization was intended to enhance the strategic influence of Iran within the Iraqi state and to consolidate the authority of the pro-Iran Shia political establishment. These militia groups evolved into tools of Iranian influence within the Iraqi state over time. The United States has designated numerous significant factions within the PMF, such as Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Imam Ali, and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiyaa, as terrorist organizations.

 For the past decade, these Iran-aligned militia groups have worked tirelessly to seize control of Iraqi state institutions. Currently, the sophistication and scope of militia state capture have increased to the point where it is exceedingly challenging to differentiate between the activities of illicit militias and those of Iraqi state institutions and political parties. Many locations have seen the deployment of shadow administrations by these groups, which have constructed security, social, political, and economic structures that both rival and undermine formal ones. They have not only regulated the movement of goods and people, but they have also imposed taxes on local enterprises, which has led to significant economic strain on the community and increased dependency on these militias for basic services. Additionally, they have become involved in religious affairs, overseeing religious sites and endowments. Not only do numerous factions within the PMF oppose disarmament, but they have also granted their armaments a status that is nearly divine. The recent statement by the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, the organization that represents the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), should be considered. The statement pronounced the weapons of the PMF to be "sacred" and non-negotiable until the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq and the attainment of full sovereignty by the country. The Iraqi government officially has de jure control over the PMF and allocates billions of dollars annually to the PMF for salaries and operations. However, the important militias that are part of the PMF in reality respond only to Iran rather than the Iraqi prime minister. Ano Jawhar Abdoka, the minister of transportation and communications for the Kurdistan Regional Government, recently wrote on X: "Iraq is being bombed from within Iraq by Iraqi military groups, who are using Iraqi weapons that were purchased with Iraqi money. The targets are Iraqi cities and Iraqi citizens." "Subsequently, everyone appears on television to discuss Iraqi sovereignty. " Mr. Jawhar was entirely correct; these rogue actors, who are financed by the Iraqi state and directed by Tehran, engage in a foreign conflict, and the repercussions of their actions are felt throughout the entire nation.

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani has failed to fulfill his commitments to Washington to address the PMF militias that are responsible for attacks on U.S. forces, American interests, and targets in the Kurdistan region, despite his repeated assurances. Not a single militia member accountable for these attacks has been apprehended or neutralised. In reality, Sudani's assurances seem to have been primarily intended to buy time with Washington, as his government continues to financially support, shelter, and politically protect the militias that are responsible for these operations. In order to guarantee the country's sovereignty and the establishment of the writ of state, Iraqi leadership must engage in a process of introspection and adopt concrete measures. The initial stage in this direction will involve the dissolution and disarmament of these armed groups.

(The author is an Australian Geopolitical Analyst and Columnist for the Middle East)