Attacks across Badakhshan are puncturing the Taliban’s aura of invincibility, even if the armed resistance remains far from threatening its rule nationwide.

Badakhshan, Afghanistan’s vast and mountainous northeastern province, was a center of resistance to Taliban rule during the 1990s. Despite repeated and intensive Taliban military operations, the rebellious province remained largely under the control of the Northern Alliance, commanded by Ahmad Shah Massoud. Now, the Taliban is once again confronting trouble in this resource-rich region. In recent weeks, Badakhshan, which borders Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan, has experienced a surge in attacks. Experts say anti-Taliban armed groups are exploiting local grievances, disputes over control of natural resources, and long-standing ethnic tensions. On July 17, Sepahiyan-e Mihan, or the Homeland Soldiers Front, a newly formed anti-Taliban resistance group, attacked the district center of Yaftali Sufla. Its force of approximately 25 fighters held the center for several hours before withdrawing. The Taliban acknowledged temporarily losing control of the district headquarters.

In the aftermath of the incursion, Taliban Chief of Army Staff Fasihuddin Fitrat visited Yaftali Sufla to assess the readiness of the group’s forces. On July 23, the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), led by former Afghan Armed Forces chief of general staff Yasin Zia, launched several targeted operations against Taliban units in Badakhshan’s Zebak district. At roughly the same time, the National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Ahmad Massoud, claimed responsibility for an attack on a Taliban outpost in the province’s Kuran wa Munjan district. The temporary seizure of a district center, followed by sustained AFF operations and an NRF attack elsewhere in the province, underscores Badakhshan’s growing importance as a battleground between the Taliban and the armed resistance. To better understand the campaign against Taliban rule in northern Afghanistan, I spoke with Dawod Naji, head of the AFF’s political committee. Naji said AFF forces had captured several Taliban outposts during recent operations and, despite counterattacks by much larger Taliban units, had defended the positions they seized. He also said the AFF had progressed from clandestine warfare to front-line combat and direct offensive operations against the Taliban. Asked about relations with other armed groups, particularly the newly formed Sepahiyan-e Mihan, Naji said the AFF maintains meaningful contact with all forces opposed to the Taliban because they are fighting toward the same objective. That shared objective, however, does not yet amount to a unified command or a common political program.

The Taliban’s own policies in the north have helped broaden support for its armed opponents. Collective punishment, arbitrary arrests, and heavy-handed security operations targeting ethnic minority communities suspected of harboring anti-Taliban sympathies have deepened local resentment. The Taliban has also clashed with some of its own local commanders from non-Pashtun minorities, primarily Tajiks and Uzbeks, who were incorporated into Taliban power structures after the collapse of the former republic. Disputes over control of local resources, including Badakhshan’s gold mines, and the central leadership’s aggressive disarmament policies have triggered open infighting. Taliban leaders appear to be taking the recent violence seriously and to have lost confidence in some local units. The Taliban has consequently deployed substantial reinforcements from its traditional strongholds. These include forces from the 219th Omar-e-Salis Division, now stationed in Badakhshan, as well as elements of the 207th Al-Farooq Corps and the newly established Hebati unit led by Mawlawi Hamidullah Musafir. The Taliban has also reportedly turned to allied militant groups for support in the north. In Nuristan province, Abdul Aziz Haqqani of the Haqqani Network recently convened a meeting with representatives of Jamaat Ansarullah, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and al-Qaeda. During the meeting, Haqqani reportedly asked the organizations to provide battle-hardened fighters to reinforce Taliban forces in the region.

Yet even after mobilizing significant forces in Afghanistan’s restive north, the Taliban faces a difficult campaign. Small, self-contained guerrilla bands moving by motorcycle or pack animal can strike convoys and isolated outposts in the country’s mountains and valleys, then disperse before heavier forces arrive. Variations of this strategy exhausted both Soviet and NATO troops. Anti-Taliban groups also benefit from highly motivated fighters, intimate knowledge of the terrain, and residual loyalty among former members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. A significant number of their commanders received training from the United States or other NATO members, giving them a degree of tactical sophistication uncommon among irregular forces. It would nevertheless be premature to conclude that the insurgency poses an existential threat to the Taliban.

These attacks could develop into a severe and enduring challenge in Badakhshan and neighboring provinces, but they do not yet threaten Taliban authority nationwide or suggest that the province is on the verge of falling. The Taliban’s adversaries have not demonstrated that they can recruit on a large scale, maintain reliable supply lines, unify their disparate fronts, or govern territory after capturing it. The Taliban, meanwhile, retains considerable advantages in intelligence, personnel, transportation, and heavy weaponry. The latest attacks may not immediately endanger its rule, but they have punctured the image of invincibility it has worked hard to cultivate since returning to power.

(The author is an Australian geopolitical analyst and columnist for the Middle East and Af-Pak)