Syria has recently become a member of the US-led international coalition against the Islamic State (IS) following a cordial meeting between Syrian leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa and U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House. Although the initiative is expected to enhance military cooperation between the United States and the Syrian government, Damascus continues to be at loggerheads with America's longstanding partner, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which administers northeastern Syria. The Trump administration is eager to promote more amicable relations with Ahmad Al-Sharaa's regime, even if it compromises the interests of longstanding allies such as the Syrian Kurds. Tom Barrack, the United States Special Envoy to Syria, expressed confidence in Damascus's decisive victory and the resolution of the conflict for all parties involved. In July of this year, he stated that Washington supports a united Syria under a single flag, a consolidated military, and a unified administration, and he would oppose the implementation of federalism. Regrettably, the United States' decision to align with the Al-Sharaa government and diminish its support for the SDF is based on a misguided and perilous assumption that Al-Sharaa will genuinely implement reforms in Syria. 

Al-Sharra has a documented history of association with extremist groups and questionable credentials. In contrast, the SDF has partnered with coalition forces for more than ten years to combat the Islamic State, playing a substantial role in the destruction of the Syrian segment of ISIS's self-proclaimed caliphate, sacrificing 11,000 fighters to do so.  Americans train the SDF counter-terrorism units, which have proven effective as a non-jihadist counterweight. Compared to the recently reorganized and fragmented forces of Damascus, they demonstrate greater professionalism and possess increased combat experience against ISIS. The territory governed by the Kurds in northeastern Syria, known as Rojava, possesses substantial strategic importance that is currently at risk. This region is rich in resources and oversees essential oil and gas deposits in the Deir Ezzor governorate, which are vital to Syria's economic stability. Consequently, Al-Sharaa remains committed to asserting its authority over these regions. The territorial authority and military strength of the SDF functioned as both a concrete and ideological barrier to the expansion of Iran and its proxies along the Shiite axis, as well as a potential resurgence of ISIS. Western nations should implement a policy of strategic safeguarding for the Syrian Kurds. This approach will enable the West to sustain substantial influence over adversarial entities and safeguard its long-term interests in a region characterized by instability rather than stability. By diminishing its military presence and support to Syrian Kurds, the United States is relinquishing influence in this critical region to a regime with a questionable ideological foundation and a similarly problematic record of conduct. 

  

Turkey's Counterproductive Role 

Turkey cannot accept the existence of a well-armed, autonomous Kurdish entity near its border, as it fears this could provoke its Kurdish populace to demand greater rights. Consequently, Turkey has previously undertaken a series of military operations, including "Operation Dawn of Freedom" and "Operation Manbij," with the aims of expanding Turkish-controlled territory and preventing any form of Kurdish autonomy in post-Assad Syria. Furthermore, Turkey's proxy forces in Syria, like the Syrian National Army (SNA), regularly clash with the SDF. Turkey's engagement in Syria extends beyond mere defense. President Erdogan perceives Syria as a platform to realize a neo-Ottoman and Islamist agenda, aiming to restore Turkey's historical role as a caliphate and a significant influence within the Muslim world. The Kurds are regarded as an impediment to achieving this objective. 

Israeli Model 

Israel's approach to the Druze minority in southern Syria offers a pragmatic framework for American and Western policy regarding the Syrian Kurds. In July 2025, the Al-Sharaa regime committed a massacre against the Druze minority in Suwayda, prompting Israel to undertake a prompt and decisive military response, which involved strikes on Syrian military command centers and the presidential palace in Damascus. This intervention was mainly carried out to back Israel’s updated security strategy in Syria, which focuses on stopping hostile forces from gaining power near its borders (especially south of Damascus) and actively protecting friendly, non-jihadist minority groups from a hostile central government. Israel's actions were driven by a long-term friendship with the Druze community, a recognition of the questionable beliefs of the new regime, and the need to maintain a safe area free from hostile groups. 

The Syrian Kurds possess several significant similarities with the Druze. They constitute a secular and non-jihadist minority with a distinct identity, serving as dependable allies of the West and its regional partners; a prominent example is Iraqi Kurdistan. The West should establish a new cooperative paradigm for the Kurds aligned with Israel’s approach to the Druze. This approach would encompass a clandestine and unofficial campaign of support—consisting of political, economic, military, and intelligence assistance—that would bolster the Kurds without conferring formal recognition as a mini-state or infringing upon the apparent sovereignty of the new Syrian government. This approach is discreet yet highly effective, providing the Kurds with vital resources for self-defense while avoiding the escalation of a wider conflict. The current administration in Damascus embodies a centralized ideology that rejects pluralism, a position held by Islamists, Salafists, and Baathists. With the backing of the United States and Turkey, Damascus is committed to eradicating Rojava; however, Al-Sharaa should recognize the current realities and reconsider his stance. A military engagement would result in devastating consequences for Syria, irrespective of the political outcome. The SDF would evolve into a revolutionary opposition, shifting its focus from self-preservation to the overthrow of the Damascus regime by any means necessary, potentially with support from Israel-aligned Druze and Alawite insurgents. 

  

(The author is an Australian Geopolitical Analyst and Columnist for the Middle East and Af-Pak.)